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BOOK REVIEWS
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE. By Paul J. Hartman. Buf-

falo: Dennis & Co., 1953. Pp. xi, 323. $7.50.
The multi-state business executive, the practicing lawyer, and the
state tax administrator will all agree that the field of state taxation of
interstate commerce presents a perplexing conglomerate of apparently
inconsistent opinions and meaningless distinctions. Even the Supreme
Court has admitted that "the history of the commerce clause has
been one of very considerable judicial oscillation."' More than a
century and a half of constitutional and judicial history still leave
without clear delineation the borderline beyond which a state tax

statute treads on ground forbidden by the commerce clause. Anything akin to a rule of property is virtually nonexistent in wrestling
with the finer questions involved in the application of the commerce
clause restriction to the complexities of modern business and its
various facets which may be selected by the legislative draftsman
for the incidence of the state tax.
Not that any other Court would have better solved the problem.
As the author notes, "Each new means of interstate transportation
and communication has engendered commerce clause controversy."
(p.13). Inevitably the struggle will continue so long. as the demands
for the free flow of interstate commerce and for additional state revenues compete. No abatement of either can reasonably be expected in
our time.
At the same time no other clause of the Constitution is as important
as the commerce clause has been in the integration of the states into
a national economic unit. The author has quoted Justice Stone in
words worth repeating here:
"Great as is the practical wisdom exhibited in all the provisions of the
Constitution, and important as were the character and influence of those
who secured its adoption, it will, I believe, be the judgment of history
that the Commerce Clause and the wise interpretation of it, perhaps more
than any other contributing element, have united to bind the several
states into a nation."2
The author begins his study of the problem with an historical approach, going back to the original Marshall doctrine, that the commerce clause limitation leaves to Congress the exclusive power to
regulate interstate commerce; under all circumstances regulation was
1. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed.

1342 (1946).
2. From an address by Justice Stone, Fifty Years' Work of the United States
Supreme Court, 14 A.B.A.J. 428, 430 (1928).
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forbidden ground to the states. As in other than developing fields of
Constitutional Law, soon came a conflicting idea, the Taney doctrine,
that the power of Congress was concurrent, and not exclusive. The
states could act so long as they did not conflict with a Congressional
enactment. These concepts were compromised in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens.3 The commerce clause prohibited only some, but not all
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; local aspects of regulation, as to which national uniformity was not necessary, were permissible. The inquiry addressed itself to the particular object on
which the power proposed to operate, rather than the source or nature
of the power. The same theory was carried into tax cases.
Then came the proposition that the silence of Congress on any
given subject left the states free to act; this seems to be part of the
theme of the general tests applied today. But as Professor Hartman
points out, it negates the theory that the states lack the power, for
Congressional silence is immaterial if the states lack the power. The
source of the impediment to state action, whether it lies in the commerce clause itself without action by Congress, is still an open question. For example, the question is raised, but unanswered, in the
4
PrudentialInsurance opinion.
While the Cooley compromise doctrine has often been invoked in
cases involving state regulation of interstate commerce, when the
power to tax is involved the opinions seldom speak of "concurrent"
powers; they generally declare that there is no local power to tax
interstate commerce. In effect, the opinions rely on the commerce
clause for a double standard of constitutionality. Professor Hartman
appropriately asks:
"What is there in the commerce clause that justifies the Court in concluding that the States have a concurrent power with Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but, at the same time, concluding that the
commerce clause forbids State taxation of interstate commerce?" (p. 260).
Although the proponents of the "exclusive" power doctrine have
over the years dominated the pronouncements of the Court, even they
must have recognized the needs of the states for revenue and the basic
equity in Justice Holmes' observation that interstate commerce "must
pay its way." For they have approved taxes on any number of activities which are in economic reality a part of interstate commerce.
This is true, for example, in many use, storage and consumption
levies; yet these decisions insist that the states cannot tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The theory is much the same as that applied by the Court in cases
3. 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (U.S. 1851).
4. Note 1 supra.
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involving federal immunity from state taxation; a tax cannot be
levied on the activities or property of the Federal Government, but
a tax levied. on a -cost-plus contractor with the Government, or
measured by units of property owned by the Government,6 is permissible. This is true even though in each instance the economic
burden of the tax is passed on to the Government. The important
point is that the asserted doctrine of prohibitions in economic reality
must be severely qualified. Interstate commerce, like the Government itself, may be economically, if not legally taxed, provided the
draftsman is careful in his selection of words, and the particular
activity on which the tax is imposed. Professor Hartman succiently
summarizes that "The Court was more concerned with captions than
with consequences." (p. 32).
Whatever the concern of the Court, little guidance was given to
either the tax administrator or tax attorney.
A commendable trend away from this worship of captions was
exemplified in Justice Stone's opinion in Western Livestock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 7 where he spelled out a new and practical approach. The
important question became not a matter of nomenclature, but,
"whether the tax as a practical matter was being used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage." This wholesome
idea, taking into consideration the economic facts of life, has faded
in such recent cases as Freemanv. Hewitt,8 and Spector Motor Service
Inc. v. O'Connor9 and in Justice Frankfurter's classification of the
cumulative burdens concept as a "fashion in judicial writing."10
Neither counsel nor the state administrator can act with any more
certainty than he could thirty years ago. Each imposition is a separate question; it matters not that the same tax cannot be duplicated
in other states to create a cumulative burden, and that no economic
discrimination results against interstate commerce. The question is,
Does the Court conclude it is or is not a tax directly on interstate
commerce? Which label does the Court, on a given day, prefer to
apply to a given factual situation?
The author illustrates the point by comparing Fisher's Blend Station v.State Tax Commission 1 and Utah Power & Light Company v.
Pfost.12 In Fisher's Blend the Court held that a state occupation tax
on radio broadcasting, measured by gross receipts, was a direct
5. Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941).
6.Esso Standard Oil Co.v.Evans, 345 U.S. 495, 73 Sup. Ct. 800, 97 L. Ed.
1174 (1953).
7.303 U.S.250, 58 Sup.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed.823 (1938).
8.329 U.S.249, 67 Sup.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed.265 (1946).
9.340 U.S.602, 71 Sup. Ct.508, 95 L. Ed.573 (1951).
10. 329 U.S. 249, 254, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed.265 (1946).
11. 297 U.S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct. 608, 80 L.Ed.956 (1936).
12. 286 U.S. 165, 52 Sup.Ct.548, 76 L.Ed.1038 (1932).
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burden on interstate commerce. The activity of producing the program and starting it on its way through the ether could not be, or
at least it had not been, separated from the interstate movement of
the radio waves. But only four years earlier in the Utah Light case
the generation of electricity had been a local activity subject to tax,
even though the electricity as generated was immediately transmitted
to out-of-state consumers. Whether there is any real difference here
can be endlessly debated between the lawyer and the physicist, who
probably would not appreciate the legal distinction.
At this point the practicing attorney or tax administrator may be
ready to conclude that this book is not for him, but is only for the
academic scholar. To the contrary, it will prove most helpful to the
lawyer advising the client who crosses state lines, and to the tax
administrator seeking a guide as to how far he can go in insisting on
liability, and yet in his own mind honestly staying within the limits
laid down by the Court. The book will not provide them with many
definite answers, for there are few in such unsettled areas as gross
receipts, and sales and use taxation. But it will provide them with
clear analyses of the leading lines of cases, discussed in separate
chapters devoted to local activity privilege, public facility (highways),
use and sales, gross receipts, and capital stock franchise taxes. It
will save many hours which would otherwise be spent in trying to
reconcile the irreconcilable.
The legislative draftsman, too, should welcome this work. It will
help to guide him in selecting the appropriate words in which to
phrase his tax statute, so that he will stay away from taxing interstate commerce itself, but will make it bear its fair share of the tax
burden.
Many practical questions occur to the lawyer and tax administrator
as he digests this work. To mention only one, the author points out
how, in General Trading Company v. State Tax Commission, 3 the
Court held that coerced collection of a use tax by an out-of-state
seller was permissible, even though the seller had no place of business
in* the taxing state, took orders through travelling salesmen, and
parted with title in his own state. An almost shocking result, the
general practitioner would say. In advising his similarly situated
selling client to refuse to collect the use tax for the buyer's state he
would point out that the seller in General Trading had voluntarily
submitted to jurisdiction. His client would not, make that mistake.
But what of the effect of the reciprocal statutes which permit each
of the reciprocating states to bring tax suits in the courts of the other?
Such statutes have been adopted by many states in the past six
13. 322 U.S. 335, 64 Sup. Ct. 1028, 88 L. Ed. 1309 (1944).
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years. Confronted with General Trading and a reciprocal tax suit
statute in each of the two states involved, it would seem that the
interstate seller no longer has any escape from being a use tax collector.
The author concludes with a challenging suggestion. He proposes
that Congress step into this "judicial oscillation" and exercise affirmative control of state taxing activities. Congress would define the
permissive and forbidden areas and types of taxes affecting interstate
commerce. But the author does not put into words a statute which he
would sponsor. That bit of draftsmanship is a project calling for
tough thinking, and one to which it is hoped the author will apply
his knowledge of the field.
A few of the many questions to be considered in finally evaluating
such a statute include:
1. Can any such statute have significance if the Court reasons as
it has on occasion, and as Justice Frankfurter observed for the majority in Freeman, that the tax is invalid if it is "directly on" interstate commerce or levied "on the very process" of interstate commerce? Under such a view, is any expression from Congress relevant?
Is it not a Constitutional amendment which is needed, authorizing
Congress to delegate to the states some of the power which is now
exclusively its own?
2. Assuming Congress can invalidate state statutes which are valid
under current decisions, how far can and should Congress go in applying its statutory axe to fell the timbers which have in some
instances for years been key pieces in the revenue structure of various
states? Do the advantages to be derived by any proposed statute
justify the very serious disruption of state finances? Or should Congress content itself merely with restricting the future exercise of
the ingenuity of the state statutory draftsman?
3. Recalling the problem of labels, so well appreciated by Professor
Hartman, what words will put the pragmatic and economic approach
into a statute which will curtail litigation and lend more certainty?
One wonders if Congress over a period of years can do any better
than has the Court.
JAIES CLARENCE

EVANS*

*Member of the firm of Farris, Evans & Evans, Nashville, Tennessee; formerly Commissioner of0Finance and Taxation, State of Tennessee.
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STATE AND FREEDOM. By Leo Pfeffer. Boston:
Press, 1953. Pp. xvi, 605. $10.00.

CHURCH,

The Beacon

The delicate issue of Church-State relations has brought a huge
harvest of cases before the American Courts in recent years. At the
heart of this issue is a basic ambiguity concerning the meaning of the
Constitutional provision which holds that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." And as the title of this book clearly implies, the relation of
Church and State bears directly on the broader question of Freedom.
Indeed, the inclusion of this passage in the Constitution reflects the
intent of the framers to insure in every way the conditions of a free
society. The conviction that there is a correlation between a free
Church and a free society had become clear a century before our Constitution was framed. Lord Acton has written that "The idea that religious liberty is the generating principle of civil, and that civil liberty
is the necessary condition of the religious, was a discovery reserved
for the seventeenth century." It is this concern about freedom, then,
that makes the Church-State issue a serious one. The spectacle of
vulgar intrusions by certain European governments into the life and
affairs of organized religious bodies is one of the fearful characteristics
of nondemocratic procedure. Yet even within the democracies, in
particular in America, the pressure of events and the conflict in ideas
about the nature of religion, and the role of its institutions, have complicated the peaceful coexistence of Church and State. And the resulting conflicts and their attempted solutions are the chief concerns
of this book.
The author, Leo Pfeffer, is a lawyer who has actively participated in
many of the cases in which the Church-State issue was at stake,
appearing before lower courts as well as the United States Supreme
Court. That the author is a lawyer does not mean that this book is
necessarily a lengthy brief in which he lays out his arguments to sustain his own point of view. It appears, rather, to be the scholarly fruit
of a conscientious lawyer who has felt the need to rediscover the
meaning of the First Amendment restrictions against the "establishment of religion" and against laws "prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with a historical
sketch in which the roots of the Church-State conflict are traced. Here
the author gives an admirable summary of the relation of organized
religion and government from ancient, mediaeval and colonial times
to the present. Moreover, he considers how other countries in our own
day are dealing with this-problem, referring particularly to ZSpain';
Portugal, Italy, Latin America, Great Britain, the Scandinavian coun-
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tries, Israel and Japan. But the most important section of Part One
is the account of the development and passage of the First Amendment
of the Constitution which contains the central principle of "separation
of Church and State." Although the Constitution does not use the word
"separation," the author adopts it as suitable for expressing the intent
of the fathers of the Constitution.
Part Two is the longest (334 pages) of the three and the most substantial. It contains a carefully documented treatment of the ways in
which the Constitutional provision that there shall be "no law respecting an establishment of religion" has become the center of fierce
controversy. The issue here is two-fold, for it is possible for the State
and the Church to engage in activities in relation to each other in such
a way that some would feel that the principle of separation has been
compromised. Controversy has resulted most quickly when the state
would grant aid to religious bodies. The author carefully distinguishes
the different ways in which the state can grant such aid. Actual
financial grants to denominational welfare organizations, permission
for the church to use state property, and the practice of providing
to church-school pupils transportation at public expense are the most
familiar activities of the state which have caused serious controversy.
The most delicate issue recently has been the problem of religious
education in the public schools and the general question of federal aid
to education. On this issue there is almost a bewildering conflict of
views. Understandably, there are those who view this issue from the
standpoint of their own religious affiliation. But it would be somewhat misleading to think that this is a quarrel between Protestants,
Catholics and Jews. Within each of these groups there is also difference of opinion making any sharp alignments inaccurate. Moreover,
there are those who take sides in this controversy not from a religious
point of view but from the conviction that the democratic philosophy
requires separation of church and state.
Part Three deals chiefly with the problem of religious freedom. The
question here is how far the state can tolerate religious belief and
practices when these would bear significantly upon the other members
of the community. Here the concerns of national security, public
morals, and public health are pitted against the freedom of a person
to believe and act as he will. These questions are raised especially in
connection with the activities of the small sects. Grave questions inevitably arise when people expose themselves to personal collective
dangers: -Does a person have the right to harm himself and others, as
in the Snakehandling sects? Does a parent have a right on religious
grounds-torprevent a child-from being vaccinated or inoculated against
diseasLe?- Can-.a-parent refuseto -allow a blood, transfusion .to be given
to a -child? :In -general, who- is to decide between .the general welfard

1954]

BOOK REVIEWS

of the state, the legitimate bounds of religious conviction and practice, and the realm of fanaticism? Such questions, although frequently
raised by cases of almost extreme eccentricity, involve the fundamental question of the entire book which I take to be this: How are
the respective claims of religion and citizenship to be reconciled? The
vast array of the material of this book would answer that the principle
of separation of Church and State is the formula. But the continued
and mounting controversy would indicate that this principle does not
yet mean the same thing to everyone.
The chief value of this book is its rich citations from cases (the
author cites 271 relevant cases), briefs, historical documents and other
pertinent materials. While much of the material is familiar and can
be found in other books, they are put together here in briefer form.
Moreover, even though the book would make excellent reading for a
general audience, it has a special merit for the lawyer's library. Being
written by a lawyer, the book inevitably points up clearly the legal
issue in most of the controversies. At the same time, the book is written with unusual clarity and facility. Though this is a full-length
treatment of this vast problem, it is not too long to be forbidding nor
too short to be inadequate. It is a very competent, thoroughly reliable
and unusually non-partisan treatment of a difficult subject.
SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF
*

Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, and Lecturer in

prudence, Vanderbilt Law School.
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